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Messages - COLD BLOOD@Brar
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841
« on: November 13, 2010, 01:07:44 AM »
Sukhi bachpan tonh hi cute hai :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh: :laugh:
:blah: :blah: :blah: :blah: :blah: :blah: :omg: :omg: :omg:
842
« on: November 13, 2010, 01:05:10 AM »
kiya baat ai ji preet ji very nice...
but hwa ch udiya karo ziyada uchei udan waaliyan de digan te sat v doongi lagdi ai.
dharti de bachhinde haan dharti te turiye j gall eho fabdi e...
nice wording ai ji tuhadi tuhadei copy rights de sab nazam poem gud hundei ne ... mera kyi waar dil karda k main eh chori karla...
very good dear
843
« on: November 12, 2010, 08:27:25 PM »
gud on u bro tnx for these poems carry on bro dont stop ilike ur posts its all gud 1
844
« on: November 12, 2010, 06:13:51 AM »
:hihpanga: Kuz changa maada aakh liya, tainu apna jaan k aakh liya. gall samz lai meri ik pyare, sajjna walon bole shabad kade sajjna layi taanei nahi hundei..
gussa gila banda apniya te karda, russ-da v man-nn de layi ai. je do din hass k naa bole sajjan, edan kadei sajjna layi, sajjna sajjan begane nahi hundei..............
mazbooriyan v mardiyan ne kayi waari, unz waadiyon bhajan da koi aadi ni hunda. dukh vich v peenda ai kayi waar banda, har banda BRARA kadei nit da sharabi ni hunda. kayi vaari apnei rishte bachaondeya, sajjna hathon sajjan katil ho jaande ne unz sajjana ne kadei sajjna te bannei nishane ni hundei............................
ki eh sach ai je koi sajjan hi ho gaya fir te tu main te main tu ho gaya fir koi apne aap nu maada kinjh bol sakda fir begana kinjh ho sakda te fir oh apne aap da kaatil kinjh ho sakda??? what u thinking about it?? please reply for this ur view if u get time
845
« on: November 12, 2010, 05:47:56 AM »
Sandhu veer tere post pad k taaan mainu saade veer Avtaar Sandhu(PAASH) di yaad aa jandi ai .....main kafee posts keetiyan c ithei Paash veer ji diyan
846
« on: November 12, 2010, 05:40:38 AM »
sidhe words vich k gore kade ni c chhad k gaye c kionke india ch riha v kush ni c bina janta de te eni janta nu roti deni uhna de vasson bahar si... gandhi ne india free karwaiya per lok aaj v gulam ni sarmaydaari de greebi de bhukh marri anpadtaa de.. tnx bro for this topic
847
« on: November 11, 2010, 07:09:41 PM »
:won: HAPPY B'DAY DEAR HV A HAPPY LIFE
848
« on: November 11, 2010, 06:42:56 AM »
ਤਰਸਯੋਗ ਹੈ ਉਸ ਕੌਮ ਦੀ ਹਾਲਤ ਜੋ ਸਿਰਫ਼ ਜਨਾਜ਼ੇ ਨਾਲ ਜਾਂਦੀ ਹੋਈ ਹੀ ਆਵਾਜ਼ ਬੁਲੰਦ ਕਰਦੀ ਹੈ ਅੱਗੇ ਪਿੱਛੇ ਨਹੀਂ; ਆਪਣੀ ਬਰਬਾਦੀ ਤੋਂ ਇਲਾਵਾ ਕਦੇ ਵੀ ਵਧ ਚੜ ਕੇ ਗੱਲ ਨਹੀਂ ਕਰਦੀ ਅਤੇ ਸਿਰਫ਼ ਉਦੋਂ ਹੀ ਬਗਾਵਤ ਕਰੇਗੀ, ਜਦੋਂ ਇਸ ਦੀ ਗਰਦਨ ਤਲਵਾਰ ਤੇ ਤੱਖਤੇ ਵਿਚਕਾਰ ਕੱਟ ਜਾਣ ਲਈ ਪਈ ਹੋਵੇ....
bilkul sahi kiha veer lokan nu gulami di zindgi jion di aadat ho gayi ai te uhna nu eh samaz aa gayi k ik bolu uhnu maar do hor koi ni bolda do din galaan kar k chup ho jaange. hun ik marn te 100 ni uthdei veer har koi apnei layi jionda .. te jad ohdi maut aondi ai te hor kisei ni aona te edan hi ik ik ho k marna ehna lokan kadei ikathei ho k ni badldei apni Takdeer nu BHAGAT SINGH ki khat gaya ehna da mohri ban k .. eh heer ranjhei pad jogei hi raih gayi ne veer....
849
« on: November 11, 2010, 06:33:41 AM »
PUNJAB POLITICS
Sikhs had to struggle for ten long years (1956-1966) to get the Punjabi Suba. They quite rightly feel that what is granted to other Indians as a right, Sikhs have to fight for it. When their magnificent contribution in the 1965 Indo-Pak War could not be ignored, Punjabi Suba was at last formed in 1966. But even that was not done in a straight forward manner. Chandigarh, the capital, became a Union Territory. The head-works and hydroelectric power stations were taken over by the Central Government and some Punjabi speaking districts were excluded from Punjabi Suba. Once again Sikhs had to start the struggle.Behind to-day's tragedy lies the bitter story of the last thirty years.The mentality of New Delhi is thanda karake khana (Cool it and eat it). Let the problems drag on. Vasantrao Naik, former CONGRESS Chief Minister of Maharashtra once said openly, "How do I solve the problems? I just do nothing. The problem is bound to go away" i.e., people are bound to get fed up with agitation or get used to putting up with difficulties.
On three separate occasions when agreement with the Akalis was in sight, Mrs. Gandhi withdrew at the last moment. When the Akalis saw that prolonged peaceful struggle yielded no results, talks with Indira Gandhi lead to nowhere, government assurances were never fulfilled, a sense of frustration, helplessness and bitterness must have set in. The extremists were bound to take over and the moderates had to shift to extremism in order to maintain their position and remain as leaders.
Many well known persons like V M Tarkunde former Judge of Bombay High Court, have remarked - If Bhindranwale is arrested Longowal, Badal and Tohra can influence the moderate opinion and negotiations can be peacefully concluded. But this would strengthen the Akali Dal and that is precisely what Indira Gandhi would not allow. No matter what the consequences for India.The politics of the Congress (I) was aimed at weakening the Akalis. Zail Singh was the Chief Minister of Punjab during 1972-77. Unlike the previous chief ministers, he came from Ramgaria (artisan) caste and not the majority Jat caste. In order to widen his power base and weaken the Akalis, he encouraged the activities of Bhindranwale and his ultra-orthodox intolerant followers. Akali-Janata coalition was in power during 1978-1980.In order to create a rift in the Akali Dal, a new faction called Dal Khalsa led by Bhindranwale was started with blessings of Zail Singh, Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi on April 13, 1978.In the year following, some policemen in Punjab went on strike and were dismissed. During the elections of 1980, Zail Singh promised to take them back if Congres (I) returned to power that promise was fulfilled. We can imagine what kind of police force Punjab had.
With his masters Zail Singh (then Union Home Minister) and Indira Gandhi firmly back in power, Bhindranwale openly attacked his opponents – the Nirankaris. Their leader Baba Gurubachan Singh and his aide were shot dead in Delhi on 25th April 1980. The killer, carpenter Ranjit Singh, escaped. All the 20 persons against whom warrants were issued, either belonged to the Jatha of Bhindranwale or were his relatives or associates and were hiding under his protection. Organised political murders were now appearing on the scene.
One year after this event, a well known journalist wrote - "Though the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has solved the murder case, it is almost certain that the killers will never be arrested because they are alleged to be in the protection of Bhindranwale. Besides, the State police is not prepared to involve itself in the case by arresting the culprits. Repeated pleas by the Governor of Delhi to the Punjab Chief Minister Mr. Darbara Singh and the letters written by the directors of CBI to the Punjab Government for help have been of no avail. The director of CBI wrote to State Government about ten days ago urging it to help the CBI by arresting the culprits and taking away their arms. But the State Government has not even acknowledged the letter. The present Lt Governor of Delhi, Mr.S.L. Khurana has again written to the Punjab Chief Minister pleading for the arrest of the suspects.
The CBI has almost completed the investigation and persons who are suspected in this case have been declared as proclaimed offenders.It was on the orders of Indira Gandhi that the murderers were not arrested or disarmed. " And exactly 3 years later, she had the audacity to say that she had no alternative to army action!! Sometime in 1980, Government of India issued an order that recruitment into the armed forces would from now on be on the basis of the population of individual state. And thus as Sikhs are less than 2% of India's population, their percentage in the Armed Forces would drop sharply - from 15% to less than 2%. This is the height of absurdity. Gujaratis are 5% of India's population. Are we going to see Indian Army with 50,000 Gujarati soldiers? Different people have different attributes and these must be utilised for the country's good. Sikhs do not claim to be the only martial race but as long as they make excellent soldiers, they should be employed as such. It is only after this Government order that we hear about Khalistan.
In March/April 1981, on the day of Baishakhi, extremists of Dal Khalsa openly demanded Khalistan. G.S. Dhillon and J.S. Chauhan were present. Imam of Delhi Jama Masjid gave his blessings. (Why was he never arrested?). Indira Gandhi had sought the blessings of the same Imam for her 1980 election campaign and yet she had the audacity to say that there was really no alternative to army action in Amritsar!!!
There was one more reason to make a Bhindran wala DAL KHALSA by Indira Gandhi. that was Nacalite, Maowadi , Kirty Kissan Union and more Red solute they wants Samazwaad they wants India Bhagat Singh di soch da that was problem for government or we can say for rich people. in the book open secretes MK Dharr officer of RAW(intelligence beuro India )said he fixd first met Bhindran Wala and Indera Gandi when Indra said to Bhindra Wala "police and me with u now u need to finish inklabi and Akali Dal"inklabi Poeter Paash Sandhu also killed by bhindran Wala,end of Indra Gandi sported and finished Bhindra Wala for political benefit
850
« on: November 11, 2010, 05:36:16 AM »
Few journalists interacted with Indira Gandhi the way Khushwant Singh, doyen of Indian journalism, did. As editor of the now defunct The Illustrated Weekly of India and later The Hindustan Times, he was witness to some of the most historic moments in Indira Gandhi's 16-year-long rule.
Now 90, Khushwant Singh's door has a warning: 'Do not ring the bell unless you are expected.' The years have not numbed his extremely sharp mind as he took a journey down memory lane with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji to recreate the life of Indira Gandhi.
The first of a series of interviews and features on rediff.com to mark Indira Gandhi's 20th death anniversary.
Twenty years later, how do you look back on Indira Gandhi?
There are two aspects to Indira Gandhi: one as the politician and the other as a human being.
As a politician, it is common knowledge about her but as a human being, very few know about her, such as her family and her staff. The rest is conjecture and make believe.
How did you get to know her?
I first met her when she was still unmarried and came to Lahore on her way to Kashmir, and she was staying with friends who had brought her over.
I have a photograph of her at our house. She was very shy and wouldn't talk much.
I next met her when she was president of the Congress. It was at a meeting over which she was presiding and I was speaking on Madam Cama, I think. Then when she became information and broadcasting minister in (Lal Bahadur) Shastri's government, I was asked to do an article for The New York Times on the possibility of her becoming prime minister.
The article was an adverse account because I quoted people saying her leading the country was not possible. India has never been led by a woman. We might have had a Razia Sultan but that was it. I also said she was not qualified except for being Nehru's daughter and the fact that she had no political base except for having become Congress president by her father.
But she did become prime minister, with the second longest tenure till date?
The fact is after Shastri, people did not want Gulzarilal Nanda or Morarji Desai, and so she became prime minister, selected by a bunch who thought they could control her. But this bunch had not reckoned with her innate political sense or that being prime minister has its own power.
She soon sidelined Morarji Desai and others like Kamaraj. She really ruled a bit like a dictator. People would say the Cabinet has only one man (Indira Gandhi) and that the rest are all hijras (eunuchs), but the fact is she reduced them to that level. How do you look back at her rule?
There is nothing spectacular about her rule.
She was incapable of tolerating any criticism and she picked up an aversion to some persons because she thought they were challenging her, among them Jayaprakash Narayan, a good, honest man. She couldn't stand him because he was a challenge to her as the leader of the country, especially as people grew disillusioned with her rule. There were problems, droughts, challenges and Jayaprakash Narayan had emerged as a leader.
During her reign, corruption increased to enormous levels. She was really very tolerant of corruption, which was another negative mark against her. She knew perfectly well that some of her ministers were extremely corrupt, yet she took no steps against them till it suited her.
If she knew someone was corrupt, she tolerated him but if it suited her, she used the same corruption charge to get rid of him. She really had no strong views on corruption, which went sky high during her time.
Also, she felt uncomfortable with educated, sophisticated people. So you have the rise of people like Yashpal Kapoor, R K Dhawan, who was a stenographer who worked in her office, Mohammad Yunus, who just hung around her.
I believe this was because she had no real education.
She went to Shanti Niketan, then she went to Badminton School abroad, then to Oxford. Nowhere did she pass an exam or acquire a degree.
I think that bred a sort of inferiority complex of not being recognised as an educated person. She would pretend to have read a lot of books. She spoke French, which she picked up when she accompanied her ailing mother Kamala to Switzerland, which went in her favour. There were pros and cons but there was this sense of insecurity when it came to highly intelligent people and people with clear records. She felt more comfortable with second-rate people. How did her insecurities, about which much has been written, affect India?
In her insecurity, she destroyed the institutions of democracy. She packed Parliament with her supporters with loyalty being more important than ability; she superseded judges; she corrupted the civil service. Favouritism became a great sport with her.
She also knew how to use people against each other and was quite a master of that. She would patronise somebody and when she thought he was getting too big, instead of appointing him to a senior post, she would appoint his close associate, knowing this would create a rift between them.
The best example is of V P Singh. It was his elder brother (Santa Bux Singh) who believed he would be made minister but instead she picked V P Singh, the lesser qualified of the two brothers, which only created enmity between the brothers. She would do this with calculated skill and in the bargain cause enmity between brothers, split up families.
In the long run it was not good for the country to play such games as she did. What is her greatest achievement?
Her greatest moment, the triumph in her life, was the way she handled the Bangladesh crisis, where all her skills came together. She made a complete fool of the Pakistanis.
India faced a huge crisis with a flood of refugees entering the country. She tried to garner international support and went round the world telling them what was happening but got no backing except from the Soviet Union, which any way was with us.
Then, when she realised the crisis had to reach a climax, she proved very astute. For instance, an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked. Today we know that it was the Indians who manoeuvred to get the plane to land in Lahore. Then, in Lahore, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (then Pakistan's foreign minister) proved stupid enough to have the plane blown up in his presence. This gave India the excuse it needed to stop flights between West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) over India, something that gave India a clear edge as the war drew nearer. Now, Pakistani planes had to fly all the way round India and refuel in Sri Lanka to communicate between the two wings.
I also think it was on her advice that the Indian Army built up the Mukti Bahini. And by the time (then Pakistan President General) Yahya Khan realised what was happening and declared war, the Indian Army was, I think, well about 100 miles inside Bangladesh. In less than a fortnight, the Pakistani army surrendered. The Pakistanis prepared to defend the towns but the Indian troops just avoided the towns and headed straight for Dhaka. It was by all accounts a master strategy and Indira Gandhi very deservedly got the Bharat Ratna. But the problem of reaching a height is that you can only come down from there. And then we have the Emergency.
Yes, that is true. But when it came to the Emergency, I think the Opposition too behaved very recklessly. There was no doubt that the country was fast sliding into chaos. I recall schools not opening, colleges not opening, huge processions, riots.
I think Jayaprakash Narayan made a mammoth mistake when he led this huge rally in New Delhi where he told the people to gherao legislators, not allow them to attend office, like it was happening in Gujarat at that time (where the Nav Nirman riots were going on and crowds had mobbed the Gujarat legislature). He asked people to do the same to Parliament in New Delhi and not allow elected people to attend to their duties. Worse, he asked the police and the Indian Army personnel to remove (the legislators).
Now, there are limits to protests in any democracy and this was exceeding the limits altogether. There were the other leaders, you can name them all, who were thoroughly enjoying her discomfiture, thinking she would fall on her own.
I wrote a letter to Jayaprakash Narayan. I knew him and was very fond of him, but I wrote that he was transgressing the boundaries of limits in a democracy. He wrote back a long letter, which I published in The Illustrated Weekly.
But before anything else could happen, the Allahabad high court judgment came through and she clamped the Emergency. I believe she was right and there was no other choice.
Do you believe after all these years that the Emergency was justified?
I still believe that when she imposed the Emergency, she had every right then because leaders of the Opposition were behaving in a total reckless, irresponsible and anti-national manner, just enjoying the spectacle.
I recall very clearly that when the Emergency was imposed, there was a general sense of relief throughout the country. Schools reopened, colleges reopened, trains ran on time, and there was a sense of gratitude that the country was back to normal.
Of course, the freedom of the people had been taken away. I called on her and told her she must not gag the press. I told her there were people like me who supported her but that no one would believe us, saying you can't say anything else or she will lock you up.
But she didn't agree saying you can't have (a state of) Emergency and freedom of the press because that would create problems. I thought she'd lock me up but she didn't, maybe because I had defended her and her son, Sanjay, long enough.
Anyway, she lifted the Emergency because she was totally misled by the CBI into believing that she was hugely popular and would win the election. And when elections were held, she was surprised to learn that she had earned so much hatred throughout the country that she was defeated.
If I can step back a bit, you said when she imposed the Emergency, there was relief in the country, yet she lost the election? So what went wrong?
What went wrong was, I think, the misuse of power by some… Sanjay Gandhi included…
When you say Sanjay, he had no legitimacy. He was only the prime minister's son. What he had in mind was absolutely correct. All the family propaganda was not working so he made it the top priority. Then slum clearing. People took the cases to court and they went on for years. He said demolish the slums but give them alternative arrangements that were done. The family planning stories were vastly exaggerated: people being picked up from cinema line queues, from villages, etc… only a tenth of them was true but these stories spread like wildfire and she paid the price. The Emergency was made into a monster.
But there must have been reasons for the Emergency to be demonised?
She had locked up so many people, including 85 year olds. Anyone who said anything was locked up. But it wasn't her alone. It was Sanjay, his wife Maneka, his mother-in-law, Mohammad Yunus, who were running riot and anyone who said anything suddenly found himself in the lockup. But if you have the Emergency and draconian laws, such excesses are bound to occur…
True, but I don't think she realised it.
Perhaps the problem started from the fact that you had the Emergency in the first place, or that you had it for so long?
I think it could have been a short Emergency and she could have handled the situation better. She could have put her foot down when she realised that people were misusing the Emergency, and there were far too many people around her who were misusing it. Also, putting the maharanis of Jaipur, Gayatri Devi, and of Gwalior, Vijaya Raje Scindia, in jail with pickpockets and prostitutes simply revealed the vindictive nature of her character. It also created a large number of enemies in very important places. That all together created hatred for the whole family.
Don't you think that when Justice Sinha passed the verdict against her, she should have stepped down?
It was a very dubious judgment: that she could sit in Parliament but she could not vote. (Nani) Palkhivala, who was her lawyer, told her that he would win the case for her in appeal. He said this verdict was a bit like locking up a person for a small traffic offence. But by then, she had become very nervous and people like Siddhartha Shankar Ray and Sanjay Gandhi advised her to impose the Emergency.
But I think if she had not done what she did, then she would have been a bigger figure. After she imposed the Emergency, Palkhivala refused to fight her case in court. Then they (Mrs Gandhi's cronies) harassed Palkhivala, he was removed from various Tata boards. And that kind of vindictiveness followed, which only created more enemies all along the way, which they needn't have done.
But then she came back to power. Now was this because the Janata Party was inept or was it also because the people said, 'Okay, we punished you, but now we want you back!' Or was it a combination of both?
Yeah, I think you are right. The anger and rancour against her had mitigated by then. Morarji Desai and Charan Singh proved totally inept in handling the situation and people said she was better than this lot.
But was not her next few years in power her worst? None of the strength of purpose that she had earlier seemed to be there.
I think that can be timed from Sanjay Gandhi's death (barely six months after she took office in January 1980). She lost her moorings when he died because he dominated her. He was a very dominating figure and she was certainly building him up to be the prime minister, totally ignoring Rajiv who she thought was a buddhu (lacking in intelligence).
After Sanjay died, she dithered, she couldn't make up her mind, she became a nervous wreck… She wouldn't sleep at nights, walking around the lawns of her residence, there was this permanent tick in her eyes, and I think it showed in the way she bungled over (Operation) Bluestar.
You believe she erred in Operation Bluestar?
I believe she was misled. I think her own judgement would have been right. She had no prejudice at all, not against the Muslims, not against the Sikhs or anyone. She consulted the people and got contrary advice from different people. She didn't trust (President) Zail Singh because he was playing both sides, sometimes supporting (Jarnail Singh) Bhindranwale against Darbara Singh (the then Congress chief minister of Punjab).
Operation Bluestar, 20 years on
So she turned to the Army and I know for certain, despite what they (the Army) say, that she was assured by people like General (Arun) Vaidya and (then Lieutenant General K S) Sundarji that once the army went in and surrounded the (Golden) Temple, no fight would be put up and Bhindranwale would surrender. I think they even said the operation would be over in two hours. It was a total miscalculation.
Bhindranwale was a thug, a fanatic, and he fought like a fanatic and didn't give in. The battle instead of two hours lasted two days and nights. And with a heavy toll.
I know that when she went to the Temple two or three days later, she was horrified because bodies were still floating in the Sarovar, there were bloodstains that were being cleaned up. She turned to [then Major General K S] Brar and asked, 'What is all this?'
She had believed the Army when it told her there would be no fighting.
851
« on: November 11, 2010, 04:28:20 AM »
Indera Gandhi did crap politics with punjab and just for vote she made punjab a hell... i am searching this stuff from long time finely i got it , when u get time please read once whole story then u could know abt indian shit system and shit mind of politicians
Terror in Punjab:
June marks the 25th anniversary of Operation Blue Star, the fancy name given by the Indian state to the military action it took at Amritsar’s Harmandir Sahib, or the Golden Temple, the Sikhs’ holiest shrine, starting on 3 June 1984. A quarter-century on, how do we describe this action, and what meaning do we attach to it? Do we describe it, as the ideologists of the Indian state continue to do, as a holy task undertaken by the Indian military to clear the temple of the militants who had taken control of it? Or do we describe it, as some Indian nationalists and leftists do, as a sad and necessary action to defeat an imperialist conspiracy to disintegrate India? Do we celebrate it, as some Hindu nationalists do, as a successful assertion of India’s Hindu strength against the Sikh minority’s separatist aspirations? Or do we condemn it, as Sikh and Punjabi nationalists do, as a genocidal attack on Sikh dignity, assertion and identity? Perhaps we decry it, as most human-rights defenders and leftists do, as a human tragedy resulting in the deaths of thousands of human beings – pilgrims, priests, Sikh combatants and Indian army men.
The contesting descriptions of Operation Blue Star and the meanings attached to it are reflections of serious fault lines in the Indian society and polity. To say that there would never be a consensus on how to describe and signify this military action may be both unreasonable and ahistorical. But to say that there is little likelihood of a consensus in the foreseeable future would be alluding to an uncomfortable truth about the fractured nature of Indian nationhood. However this operation is described and whatever meaning is subsequently attached to it, one thing is clear: one day, everyone else might want to forget it – and, indeed, might succeed in doing so – but this will never be true of the Sikh community.
Operation Blue Star has become an integral part of the Sikh collective historical memory. It has become the third ghallughara (holocaust) in Sikh history – the first referring to the massacre of some 10,000 Sikhs in 1746; the second to the even larger massacre of Sikh men, women and children in 1762, when 30,000, 50 percent of the population, were slaughtered. Today, evidence gathered by this reviewer suggests that many (though not all) gurdwaras in India and abroad include references to the third ghallughara in their daily ardas, or prayers.
The most reliable estimates of the total number of deaths during Operation Blue Star are anywhere from 5000 to 7000. Yet a crucial difference between the third ghallughara and the previous two is that this massacre occurred in the Golden Temple, while the first two took place on open battlefields. This gives added religious dimension to the significance of the military action: a much larger number of Sikhs died during Partition, but the 1947 deaths are not seen in terms of attacks on and in defence of religion. In religious terms, the largest Sikh loss in 1947 was the fact that the Nankana Sahib gurudwara – marking the birth place of Guru Nanak, the founder of the faith – was suddenly located in Pakistan. This, too, was a loss that today figures in the daily ardas.
Non-violent dissent Ram Narayan Kumar’s book is an attempt to trace the roots of Sikh dissent in India that eventually culminated in the armed confrontation in 1984. Kumar also deals with the post-1984 period of Sikh militancy and the Indian state’s success in countering this militancy. Kumar makes three important contributions to the existing literature on the post-1984 developments, by placing them in a larger historical context: first, that Sikh militancy has been defeated; second, that the upper-caste Punjabi Hindus had a decisive say in the strategic planning at the Centre in organising the Sikh defeat; and third, that the Indian intelligence agencies executed this planning by using complex and sometimes contradictory methods to prop up the armed Sikh opposition, and to infiltrate and manipulate that opposition in order to weaken and undermine democratic Sikh political formations, such as the umbrella formation, the Akali Dal.
Kumar, a human-rights researcher currently based in Kathmandu, documents and pays tribute to the Akali tradition of non-violence. He refers to the Akali Dal’s peaceful struggle for a Punjabi-speaking state, and makes an important point of historical value by highlighting that the Akali agitation of the 1980s for Punjab’s demands constituted “the largest non-violent movement in the sub-continent, including both the colonial and the independent periods, with over 150,000 volunteers courting arrest with in a period of three years.” He also points out that the Akali Dal was the only organisation that was able to sustain an uninterrupted non-violent movement against the 1975 Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi.
The extensive elaboration and documentation of this non-violent character of Akali struggles enables the author to expose the intellectual poverty of the international media in its narratives and unidimensional portrayals of the Sikhs and the Akalis as ‘militants’, ‘violent’ and ‘terrorists’. Kumar attributes this to the lack of resources made available to journalists to investigate relevant issues, and their consequent reliance on Indian government briefings and police handouts. Some space is also devoted here to a critical evaluation of the partisan and destructive role played by the Arya Samaj-controlled media in Punjab. (With origins in the late 19th century, Arya Samaj, a reformist and Hindu supremacist organisation has extensive cultural and political influence in North India, particularly in education and media in Punjab.) This aspect of Kumar’s work is especially fascinating, and confirms this reviewer’s own research on the anti-Sikh bias of government media (Doordarshan and All India Radio) and Delhi-based English-language dailies.
Drawing on more than two decades of research in Punjab, Kumar is able to provide impressive evidence that government agencies systematically encouraged and used extremist and fringe groups in Punjab to undermine the main democratic opposition structures of the Akali Dal against the ruling Congress party. He has complemented that evidence by sourcing material from the explosive confessions of a former intelligence officer named M K Dhar, whose 2005 book, Open Secrets, provides fascinating firsthand accounts not only of the intelligence agencies’ manipulation of extremist groups but also of their liquidation once these groups had been used or came to be considered a nuisance. While praise is due for Dhar’s moral courage in publishing this insider’s account of the role of intelligence agencies in conflict inflation and resolution, it is also important not to forget that it speaks about the strengths of the democratic spaces that such a book could be published, distributed, read and reviewed in India. From this point of view, recent moves by the Indian state to muzzle the voices of ex-intelligence personnel are dangerous signals. A dual defeat One criticism of Kumar’s book is that it denies agency and autonomy to the Sikh militant groups in the shaping of their political activities. Terror in Punjab presents these groups merely as pawns in the hands of Indian intelligence operatives. A better methodological approach might have been to accord the necessary autonomy to the growth of militancy and the groups advocating the militant path, and then to bring in the evidence of infiltration and manipulation to show the twists and turns of the activities of various militant activities. Such an approach would have ensured an integration of two processes: the emergence of militant groups in terms of their own ideology, history, factional politics and local conditions; and their manipulated use and liquidation by the Indian intelligence agencies and security forces.
The central point about the Sikh defeat deserves to be further probed in its various dimensions. It is admirable that Kumar has written this book to expose the victor (the Indian state) and defend the defeated (the Sikhs). In so doing, he has tried to reverse the oft-repeated claim that history is always written by the victors. It is even more praiseworthy that, despite having come from a non-Punjabi background, Kumar has chosen to articulate the perspective of Punjab and the Sikhs simply because he believes that it is important to recognise that the Sikhs have been unfairly treated by the repressive power of the Indian state. He emphasises further that the defeat of Sikh militancy has been justified by the writings of the overwhelming majority of the academic and journalistic accounts of the Punjab conflict, thus in a way handing the Sikh community a double defeat: military and ideological. Military suppression of Sikh militancy signified the military defeat, and the media/academe’s success in justifying the suppression of both the violent and non-violent forms of Sikh protest signified the ideological defeat.
If we ask Sikhs today whether they feel defeated, and whether the Indian state considers that it has defeated the Sikhs, we are likely to get an ambiguous answer. The Sikhs have indeed been defeated, at least militarily; but the collective Sikh pride prevents many from accepting this reality at the community level. Similarly, the Indian state is aware of its success in crushing the armed rebellion, but there is nervousness in openly admitting and claiming military success. New Delhi would like to suggest that it won the battle of Punjab by winning Sikh hearts and minds – but it knows this to be untrue. Therefore, both the Sikh community and the Indian state collude in camouflaging, for different reasons, the fact that the Sikhs have been defeated.
Fighting nationalisms What should be the human-rights approach in dealing with this complex situation of defeat, which no one can claim? Kumar’s book is an attempt to put forward the position of truth, accountability and justice as a methodology to study and a tool with which to deal with this painful situation. Kumar believes truth and justice can heal the wounds – that is his hope. But he is simultaneously troubled that the truth will never be allowed to come out and that justice will never be done.
As for how to think about Operation Blue Star, first and foremost it was a massive human tragedy. It was a tragedy that could have been avoided if – and that is a big if – Indira Gandhi had had a larger vision to reach a political settlement with the Akali Dal. Most Akali Dal demands – regarding federal decentralisation, river-water rights, territorial readjustment and the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab as its capital – could have been negotiated. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi agreed to each of these demands, plus many more. It is a different matter that he implemented none.
Indira Gandhi’s political calculations – those of using the ‘Hindu card’ for electoral victories – led her to deliberately choose a dangerous path of confrontation, first with the Akalis and eventually with the entire Sikh community. She paid for this miscalculation with her life, but still left Punjab and India communally scarred and polarised. Sikh nationalism was defeated militarily, but Hindu nationalism was unleashed so powerfully that the Hindu nationalists now openly make claim to capturing the Indian state.
Regarding the demands that led to the Akali agitation of the early 1980s and subsequent developments, the situation today remains where we were back then. As far as accountability for atrocities is concerned, Kumar suggests that the Indian government take a bold step in following South Africa’s example, “by establishing a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the truth about the sordid world of counter-insurgency operations in Punjab which Dhar has revealed through his confessions and by placing the findings before the country through the publication of White Paper.” No one wants history to be repeated. The least anyone can do today is to remember those thousands – pilgrims, priests, politicians, traders, militants, policemen and soldiers – who became victims in the tragedy of the third Sikh ghallughara
852
« on: November 11, 2010, 03:20:45 AM »
arunduti rai ji nu mere walon LAAL SALAM
mainu bda dukh hoyia c jis din main news padi c arunduti rai ji de against wrant kad ditei gayi c saadei mulk ch bolan da te right hai per sirf poonjipatiyan di boli jo koi kamzor layi bolda ai saade kol bdei sakhat rules ne us di zubaan band karn layi...
INDIA SHAME SHAME INDIAN POLITICS SHAME SHAME tnx ji edan da post paon layi main Green Hunt de kush paire pade c paihlan v but bda vadiya laga eh post dekh k
thnx Buddy
853
« on: November 10, 2010, 07:54:09 AM »
sarb ji saare thanwaan te short cut ni maride kadei kush time lambe raste v tur layida, manzilan de raah kinei aukhei hundei ai pta lag jaanda.. saar ansh eh ai veeer k banda jail de 20saal de todiyan ni tutda par apniyan de todiyan ik raaat ch hi tut jaanda duniya di parwaah ni hundi kisei nu par apne be-mukh ho jaan jina layi apne dil da khoon nichodiya hovei taanh banda tut jaanda ...
nice 1 Guglo ji
854
« on: November 10, 2010, 07:38:04 AM »
veer ji gal pagdi di ya moneyan di ni ai khalsa te uhi ai jo khals ai pure ai jo lard sakda kisei kamzor layi te jo mar sakda kisei hor de layi
baaki bda sohna likkhiya tnx
855
« on: November 10, 2010, 07:12:07 AM »
mushkil se pathar banaya tha is jigar ko ajj fir pigal gaya,
nice ai Guglo ji ik peed nikali dil chon badi der baad tere eh topik pad k... tnx dear
856
« on: November 10, 2010, 07:00:02 AM »
eh insaan jo samei samei haiwaana tonh v bahtar banei ne, ena de keetei aihsaan Rab de sir hamesha latkdei rain ge. jo insaana nu dukh de gaye rab nu khush karn layi, eh daag insaniyat de mathe tonh laine ni te Zakham insaana de Brara SDA taskde raingei.....
Anyway guglo ji nice ai te dimag ch oh sab kush ik supne waang ghum gaya main dekhiya c Trayi de sikhan da haal jad main UP gaya c udon Utranchal baniya c .. Surjit Singh Barnale nu uthon da RAJPAAL bna dita c politions ne taanh k sikh dukh bhul jaan all of bastd...
857
« on: November 10, 2010, 06:45:00 AM »
Guglo ji well dn.. sahit de edan de warke fole ne tusi please dont stop it .. tuhada eh topic pad k badi khushi hoyi edan di koshish karde raihna.. sahit saathon kaafi door ja chuka ajjj tusi mila dita.. assi v taan sahit naaal rishte todi baithe haan jidan bina pairan de sahit c te assi safar naalshuru hi ni keeta Thanks guglo ji for this.......
858
« on: November 09, 2010, 07:40:01 AM »
gud job buddy Gurdaas mann saahib is forever
859
« on: November 09, 2010, 07:35:36 AM »
United Nations: After years of intense diplomatic canvassing, it’s time for the pay off. The UN votes on Tuesday to elect five new non- permanent members of the UNSC.
India is standing unopposed for the Asia seat after the only other contestant in this category, Kazakhstan, withdrew from the race in December last year.
Still, India needs to clinch two-thirds of the General Assembly vote, that’s 128 votes to win a seat at the UN high table.
Also significant is that three emerging economies – India, Brazil and South Africa – will occupy seats on the Council at the same time.
“As you know, all these countries are aspirants for permanent membership of the Security Council and we hope that if things work out, all of us will utilize our time on the Council to work and achieve an early expansion in permanent membership,” said Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.
With India being the only contestant in the Asia category, Tuesday’s election may be a mere formality but what New Delhi will be watching for, is the final tally of votes. A strong majority could be seen as proof of India’s acceptability and further bolster India’s claim for a permanent seat when serious negotiations begin for expanding the Security Council next year.
860
« on: November 09, 2010, 07:27:49 AM »
Have a look at their website. I have been to the shop in the West End of London. I think it is a bit over rated. However, the website is very classy.
The link for the site is below.
http://www.theeastindiacompany.com/
tnx buddy for this workout good job...
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